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Abstract: Cyber attacks can cause cascading failures and blackouts in smart grids. Therefore, it is highly necessary to identify
the types, impacts and solutions of cyber attacks to ensure the secure operation of power systems. As a well-known practice,
steady-state analysis is commonly used to identify cyber attacks and provide effective solutions. However, it cannot fully cover
non-linear behaviours and cascaded blackouts of the system caused by dynamic perturbations, as well as provide a post-
disturbance operating point. This study presents a novel approach based on dynamic analysis that excludes the limitations of
the steady-state analysis and can be used in the events of various cyber attacks. Four types of common attacks are reviewed,
and their dynamic impacts are shown on the IEEE benchmark model of the Western System Coordinating Council system
implemented in MATLAB Simulink. Then, recommendations are provided to enhance the security of the future smart power grids
from the possible cyber attacks.
1 Introduction
The malicious cyber attacks are severe disruptive events which
cause unsatisfactory behaviour of smart grids and lead to mal-
operation of computers and electronic controls, tripping of motors
and generators, load shedding and cascading failure of the system
[1]. This paper discusses some major issues concerning the
common security threats to the access points of digital protective
relays. In a critical structure like power grid, the most common
form of cyber attacks are false or spurious data injection to the
computer-aided system operating devices, denial of service (DoS)
events on the device to device communication facilities, malicious
switching behaviour of circuit breakers (CBs)/isolators and so on.
Cyber attacks targeted to a smart grid includes password
pilfering, DoS, man-in-the-middle, replay, jamming channels,
popping the human–machine interface, integrity violations, privacy
violations and so on. The impacts of the cyber attacks can cause
variety of severe consequences in the smart grid, from energy theft
to a massive blackouts or destruction to critical infrastructures such
as prime movers or generators. Several high profile attacks on
critical infrastructures and industrial control systems are reported
in recent years [2]. Different types of DoS attacks such as
jamming, spoofing and data flooding attacks can cause from
delaying the time-critical messages to complete denial-of-service
by making the communication with a device to be impossible or
causing the device to crash or reset. The Aurora Generator Test and
coordinated cyber attacks in the Ukraine power station prove the
severity of disruptive switching executions and DoS attacks to the
digital protection devices of power systems [3, 4].
A cyber attack can be initiated by professional hackers,
malicious insiders or organised criminals. The attacker can exploit
the flaws and vulnerabilities in software and communication
protocols to electronically invade the power system operational
networks. Attackers can gather a system's information after
extensive reconnaissance of targeted networked components and
utilise the weakness of physical security policies to initiate attacks
on substations, control centres, transmission and distribution
infrastructures by compromising critical protective devices.
Protective devices (i.e. relay) in the substation not only operate
during faults or abnormal situations, but also can be opened and
closed remotely by the system operator via wireless
communication channels. Digital protection devices, which are
operated via unsecured communication networks, are vulnerable to
several cyber threats [5].
Several attempts have been performed in the literature to
increase the cyber-security of the power grid against possible cyber
attacks using steady-state analysis. In [6–9], authors showed that
false data injection (FDI) attacks can mislead the state estimation
process of the power grid using topology information of an attack-
free system. A comprehensive review of FDI attacks and detection
techniques on compromised system topology information can be
found in [10, 11]. Kim and Tong [12] proposed a heuristic method
to prevent the undetectable attacks performed by the weak
adversaries with only local information. In [13], a mathematical
framework is proposed to quantify the economic impact of the
topology data attacks in electricity market when virtual biding
strategy is conducted by an attacker. This method performs the
steady-state analysis on a transmission line to calculate the
adversary's profit at particular virtual biding buses. In [14], a
steady-state based metaheuristic optimisation algorithm is
proposed to solve three attack models. However, the steady-state
analysis is performed based on power-flow analysis which does not
fully cover a system's non-linear behaviours and dynamic response.
For instance, the variation of frequency, which is always
assumed to be constant in power-flow analysis, is not taken into
account in steady-state analysis. Moreover, the steady-state
analysis is unable to address the sequential switching events as
well as providing a post-disturbance operating solution. In [15], a
cyber-resilient line current differential relay (LCDR) is proposed
which can detect FDIAs against LCDR, but is limited to FDI
attacks on LCDRs only. Attack resilient distance protection scheme
is proposed in [15, 16] though the cyber vulnerabilities still exist
for over-current relays and directional relays. A novel risk
assessment method is proposed in [17] by analysing the
relationship among protective device settings, protection and CB
logics during cyber attacks. Although the presented risk assessment
method is applicable to identify the power grid behaviour during
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cyber attacks, it is not effective during normal physical faults. The
power grid behaviour during faults and cyber attacks could be
significantly different and need to be considered while performing
a risk assessment. To address these gaps, this paper presents the
dynamic impact analyses of a real interconnected power system
during different types of cyber attacks.
In [18], an attempt is conducted to investigate the impact on the
cyber-physical power grid in cases where communications and
operations of distributed energy resources are manipulated by an
adversary. In [19], research is conducted to assess the dynamic
impacts of hypothesised cyber attacks on substations and
concluded that the dynamic study is more capable in detecting
cascading failure due to cyber attacks. However, Ten et al. [19]
only evaluate the dynamic impacts of one type of attack, which is
the disrupt switching attack, and the dynamic impact analysis of
other types are not covered. Random switching attacks, data
integrity attacks, replay attacks and DoS attacks are most possible
threats to generate false trip-commands to the relays [20].
Therefore in this paper, a rigorous analysis is performed to
investigate the dynamic performance of an IEEE benchmark model
of Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) during the event
of four types of cyber attacks in the system. Moreover, the dynamic
impact of the system during attacks is compared with the system's
dynamic behaviour during normal physical faults. As a result, the
efforts made in this paper open a wide horizon of exploring and
developing new cyber-attack detection and mitigation techniques,
which utilise distinctive dynamic responses of the system
properties.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the protection setting and configuration of a digital overcurrent
relay. Section 3 reviews different types of attack models. In Section
4, the description of an interconnected power system model is
illustrated. Then in Section 5, the dynamic impact of attack models
is depicted and critically discussed followed by the
recommendations and future directions. Section 6 presents the
conclusion of this research.
2 Protection settings and configurations
In this section, a set of protection configurations with inherent
digital logic processing capability of a digital overcurrent relay,
which is the main target of cyber attacks, is discussed. A simplified
schematic diagram of the digital overcurrent relay is shown in
Fig. 1. The data acquisition block performs the front-end functions
of the digital protective relay. Data acquisition block is connected
to a database through a communication channel to store fault
information. Each set of current signals at each node is a source of
continuous measurement of current obtained from the current
transformer (CT), which can be obtained as follows:
zI = Iire
a, b, c…, Iiim
a, b, c T (1)
where Ia, b, c is the measured phase currents for ith node. In order to
present an accurate model of the microprocessor based overcurrent
relay, the analogue input current signals from CT are converted
into digital signals by analogue-to-digital conversion (ADC). An
ADC converts certain range of the input signal using a certain
number of bits (N) and the minimum recognisable change of the
signal can be assumed as
ΔX = 2Xmax
2N (2)
where 2Xmax is the measured phase currents and N is number of
bits for the current channels. A filter is also used to extract the
fundamental signal and eliminate both the aliasing frequencies and
the signal spectrum that are not utilised by the overcurrent relays.
The values of the processed current signals from the CT
measurements are fed to the relay protection block which compares
the measured values with the threshold or pickup values.
The equivalent phasor measuring unit is used for the estimation
of the current's amplitude at each phase. The rated current
contributed from the generator during fault can be calculated by
using the following mathematical equation:
IRated =
P
3 × VL − L × cos θ (3)
where P is the power, VL − L is the line-to-line rms voltage and cos θ
is the power factor of the generating resource.
The decision threshold or pickup value is to be set with care, i.e.
taking into account the maximum expected load current and
minimum fault current in the protection relay operation. The usual
pickup current (Ipickup) of the relay generally lies in between the
maximum load currents and the minimum fault currents of a
system which can be written as [20]
Iloadmax < Ipickup ≤ Ifaultmin (4)
where Iloadmax is the maximum load currents and Ifaultmin is the
minimum fault currents.
The pickup current should be above the maximum load current
to ensure the relay does not trip at normal load conditions, which is
normally within a continuous range on relay's available settings.




where Ipickup is the primary pickup current and CTRi is the CT
ratio.
In this paper, different levels (e.g. high, warning and normal) of
the threshold values for the overcurrent relay at each phase are
considered according to the information of phase current under
maximum loading and short-circuit conditions to configure the
activation of the relay operation. This threshold setting should also
comply with practical range of the relay settings which normally
ranges from 50 to 200% of the rated currents [20]. In this paper, the





IHigh, ITH ≤ IM < ∞ (6a)
lim
IN → ITH
IWarning, IN ≤ IM < IW (6b)
lim
0 → IN
INormal, 0 < IM ≤ IN (6c)
The high range (IHigh) is the over current range if the measured
current from CT exceeds the threshold value for a given fault. The
warning range (IWarning) lies between the threshold and normal
current limits subject to a time delay set for a very short duration of
overcurrent spike to activate alarm. The third range is the normal
range (INormal), which is above zero but less than the normal current
limit for safe operation.
A suitable minimum grading time interval for overcurrent relay
operation can be calculated as follows [21]:
Fig. 1  Schematic diagram of digital overcurrent relay
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100 × t + tCB + t0 + ts (7)
where ECT is the allowable CT ratio error (%), t is the nominal
operating time of relay close to the fault location, tCB is the CB
interrupting time, t0 is the protection relay overshoot time and ts is
the safety margin of relay operation. The speed of the overcurrent
relay depends on the shorter data window of the current magnitude
measurement as it enhances the faster relay decision-making
capability.
Generally, a deterministic approach is used for decision making
where the decision concerning state of the protected plant is taken
by comparing measured criteria values with appropriately set
thresholds. The decision-making problem is formulated as the
discrimination is made when the criterion value is higher than the
pre-defined current pickup value (threshold), which eventually
separates two classes of events, e.g. normal operation versus fault
conditions. Once the actual current value is obtained from data
acquisition, this current is fed into the relay protection algorithm
decision-making unit block, which compares this value with the
pickup value to determine alarm or tripping logic. If the input
current is within the warning range, it executes alarm signal, and if
it exceeds the pickup value, the relay will generate a trip signal to
open the CB. The following flag determines the signature of a fault
and the relationship of the fault status, measured relay current (IM)
and threshold limit (Ipickup) which can be written as
Fs =
0, 0 < IM ≤ Ipickup
1, Ipickup < IM < ∞
(8)
In this paper, the overcurrent functionality is used for each of the
three phases and the output of the relay is connected to the OR
logic to generate the trip signal. The OR logic enables the control
signal of the relay to activate when a fault occurs on any of the
three phases. The outputs of these relays are connected to the OR
logic to generate the trip signal for CBs with a very little time delay
to avoid unnecessary tripping. However, if the duration of shorter
overcurrent period is less than the set time value, relay will raise
alarm signal whereas it will issue a trip signal in case if the
duration of overcurrent exceeds the delay.
In (8), when the measured CT current through the relay (IM)
flows below the threshold limit (Ipickup), the fault status (Fs) will be
set to ‘0’ whereas Fs will be set to ‘1’ when IM exceeds Ipickup due
to a fault in the system. The relays apply the set of protection
logics according to the fault status flag and if fault exists, the relays





1, Fs = 0 → CB close
0, Fs = 1 → CB open
(9)
3 Attack models
According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC)'s Protection System Misoperation Task Force reports, over
20% of the protection misoperations occur due to relay/CB
malfunctions [22]. One possible reason for the protection
misoperation is critically identified as malicious cyber attacks due
to the compromise of security flaws and vulnerabilities in the
software and information channels. Successful cyber attacks
against protection systems result an unusual operation of the relays
due to insufficient requirements of authentication [20]. In such a
case, it is very important to understand the impacts of malicious
activities on the operational behaviour of the power system.
Digital overcurrent relays are an integral part of the modern
interconnected power system that are used to operate the system
safely and securely during the event of credible contingencies in
the power grid. Digital overcurrent relays usually protect the major
components of power systems from high surge of currents, which
could severely damage the components and be one of the main
reasons of blackout, if not properly mitigated. When an overcurrent
relay is compromised by an attacker, the power injections and load
demand would largely be impacted and even disconnected from the
main system. The compromised relay could change the topology of
the power grid and consequently cause unstable operation of the
grid. Eventually, it is also challenging to distinguish the operation
of overcurrent relays for short circuit faults and cyber attacks.
Therefore, digital overcurrent relay scheme is considered here as a
critical component to investigate the vulnerabilities of different
attack scenarios on the relay operation.
Information and communication technology based digital
protection system is one of the most critical infrastructure where an
attacker sends preset thresholds to a relay or directly/indirectly
tampers with a relay's commands to affect the relay operation and
limit its availability. The attacks on relays mainly involve: (i)
compromising the relay trip signals, (ii) sending spurious
commands to the relay through a compromised channel to cause an
incorrect operation and (iii) manipulating the relay settings to cause
unstable operation during fault events. A series of preplanned relay
failures can cause power outages. In this paper, a realistic case is
considered to model the cyber attacks where the adversary can
have access to a subsystem and manipulate the information from a
remote computer. Accordingly, four different classes of possible
attack models as shown in Fig. 2 are reviewed and discussed
below. 
3.1 Switching attack
Attacks on the switching mechanism or relay tripping functions
that change the CB's mode of operation generally stand for
switching attacks. A random switching vector signal S(x, t)ϵℝm × 1
is considered where S(x, t) dictates when to open or close a specific
breaker for a given switching attack. The attack vector could be
S(x, t) = [s1s2…sm]T = [00…0]T, where m is the number of targeted
CB. A malicious switching attack, from an external adversary, can
have access to the functions of a digital relay which controls the
tie-line CBs and may also impact the protection of a generator
substation. Such attacks may cause disconnection of the generator
substation from rest of the network and disable a specific
interconnector between two areas, hence the power flow across the
tie lines is affected.
3.2 Data integrity attack
The spurious injection attack in the form of data integrity attack
can alter any control setting of the digital protection relays so that
the protective devices operate wrongly. An external attacker hacks
the protection and control algorithms of a digital relay through
compromised communication channel. As a result, the perpetrator
can gain control of the relay and manipulate the protection
algorithms within the relay. This may cause unusual CB operation
and make a line out-of-service, even if there is no physical
disturbance.
According to the discussion above, integrity attacks can be
modelled as the manipulation of relay pickup current settings,
Fig. 2  Attacks on digital overcurrent relay
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which is used to determine the CB control or trip signal. If PSi is
the relay pickup current setting, the compromised setting can be
written as
P̄Si = PSi ± PSia (10)
where P̄Si is the compromised setting and PSia is the injected
spurious information by the attackers.
3.3 DoS attack
A DoS attack occurs when the attacker attempts to prevent or
exploit the services of the relay from performing a necessary
service. In this scenario, the attacker occupies excessive
communication resources which in turn affects the availability of
the captured information. This type of attack overwhelms a
system's communication resources so that the system becomes
unresponsive to other service requests. Two attack policies can be
adopted here:
• Attack policy (1): In this case, DoS attack blocks the relay
operation by transmitting malicious information to the targeted
digital relays. The targeted attack compromises the transmission
of control logic signal from the relays to the corresponding local
CBs and permanently blocks the operation of protective devices
during the event of credible contingencies. As a result, the
control commands or breaker reclosing commands from the
relay are not functioning as expected to mitigate the severity of
the fault or disturbances. For example, due to this attack, the
control logic (or reclosing instruction) cannot be transmitted to
the local CBs to respond in any fault event.
• Attack policy (2): In this scenario, DoS attack keeps the relays
in idle condition for a certain amount of time by preventing the
relay from responding to any disturbance event. This type of
attack may either prevent relay to immediately issue a trip signal
to open CBs when there is a fault in the relevant section of the
grid or create a delay to send control command to close/re-close
the CBs when the fault is cleared.
3.4 Replay attack
A replay attack is a spurious strategy, in which a valid data is
maliciously or fraudulently repeated. In the event of replay attacks,
attackers can repeat the data recorded from a compromised
database or data recorder for a certain time. In this scenario,
attackers can gain remote access to penetrate the network
information and may simply sniff the network traffic. They can
record a set of previously occurred disturbance data, using perhaps
a digital fault recorder (DFR), or compromising breaker status logs
within a certain time interval. The attackers may resend the
recorded information of the previous event to targeted network
component to re-simulate that event, which may perform malicious
tripping of CBs and lead to an unplanned power outage. Such an
attack is difficult to detect without further examination of actual
information and the resulting attack violates the timing constraints
of CB operation. A simple mathematical model of relay attack on
protection system can be presented as below.
Let Fs(k) ∈ F̄(k), where F̄(k) be the kth set of fault information
stored in DFR. In the event of replay attack, the compromised set
of DFR information can be written as
F̄(k) ∈ f ka (11)
where f k
a is the compromised set of past information from the
DFR, which could be a single fault status or multiple fault statuses.
4 Overview of the test grid
In this paper, the IEEE benchmark model of WSCC 3-machine 9-
bus test system is considered for simulation and attack generation
purposes (Fig. 3). Total 600 MW loads are connected to the system
and two generators of 400 MVA, 20 kV (generator 2) and 250 
MVA, 18 kV (generator 3) and one infinite bus are connected to
support the power demand of the system. Infinite bus, generator 2
and generator 3 are connected to bus 1, bus 2 and bus 3,
respectively. Two transformers of 400 MVA, 20 kV/230 kV and
250 MVA, 18 kV/230 kV are used for stepping up the generated
voltage to the transmission line voltage. The base voltages are
selected as 18, 20 and 230 kV. The 20 kV/230 kV transformer is
connected between bus 2 and bus 7 and the 18 kV/230 kV
transformer is connected between bus 3 and bus 9. The bus 8 is
Fig. 3  WSCC 3-machine 9-bus system
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connected to bus 7 and bus 9. CBs and relays are used to connect
and disconnect loads and transmission lines on a bus. Advanced
metering devices are embedded in relays at different substations to
measure the voltages and currents, and generate tripping
commands for the CB. In the model shown in Fig. 3, each distinct
bus indicates a substation at which relays and breakers are
connected. For instance, bus 8 belongs to the substation 8 and is
considered as the remotely located substation which is vulnerable
to cyber attacks. The attackers target the digital protective relay R
8–7 to initiate different types of cyber attacks and maliciously
operate the CB BR 8-7. The overall system frequency is 60 Hz. A
300 MW load is connected to bus 8 and two 150 MW loads are
connected to bus 5 and bus 6, respectively. Bus 7 is connected to
bus 5 and bus 5 is connected to bus 4. Besides, the bus 9 is
connected to bus 6 and the bus 6 is connected to bus 4. The load
data and transmission line data are summarised in Tables 1 and 2. 
Rest of the system details are available in [23].
5 Dynamic impact analyses and
recommendations
The IEEE benchmark WSCC 3-machine 9-bus test system is
simulated in MATLAB/Simulink environment. One three-phase to
ground fault and four types of cyber attacks such as random
switching attack, integrity attack, DoS attacks and replay attacks
are simulated in the system and the dynamic impacts of credible
contingency and cyber attacks on the test system are investigated.
The cyber attackers, as discussed in the previous section,
manipulate the relays of critical pathways of vulnerable
substations. Due to the malfunction of substation relays, the
affected power system experiences an unexpected dynamic
behaviour which may result in cascading failures and system
blackouts. For the dynamic behaviour analysis, it is assumed that
the attacker is able to compromise the operation of a single
substation to comply with a practical availability of limited
system's information to the attacker. The impacts of the three-phase
to ground fault and different types of cyber attacks on system's
dynamic performances are discussed in the following subsections.
5.1 Impact analyses of credible contingency
The impact of three-phase to ground fault as the most severe type
of contingency is analysed in this section. Protective relays are
designed to sense the abnormal behaviour of the system by
measuring the voltage and current fluctuations and sending
commands to the CBs to clear the fault. In this paper, a three-phase
to ground fault is created at bus 8 at 10 s and cleared at 10.2 s. The
relay R 8-7 at the substation 8 senses the abnormal level of currents
and voltages and sends a trip command to the CB BR 8-7. The
dynamic parameters measured before, during and after the fault are
presented in Fig. 4. The fault current at bus 8 rises up to 3000 A
and the overcurrent relay R 8-7 immediately detects the abnormal
situation. The tripping action is executed within 0.2 s which meets
the standard practice for power system (Fig. 4a). The load angles
of the generator 2 and generator 3 also drop drastically due to the
sudden increase in the current (Fig. 4b). The three-phase voltages
are dropped to zero during the fault (Fig. 4c) and recovered after
clearing the fault. The generated active powers from the generators
also increase and then return to their normal operating point after
clearing the fault (Fig. 4d). As the results of the three-phase to
ground fault in Fig. 4 show, all the currents, voltages, load angels
of generators and the delivered powers are considerably fluctuated
at the time of fault happening. Following that, the CT and/or
potential transformer report such disturbances to the connected
relays to protect the system via opening the CBs.
Table 1 Load data





Table 2 Transmission line data
Branch Y, pu X, pu R, pu
4 to 5 0.079 0.092 0.017
4 to 6 0.079 0.092 0.017
6 to 9 0.179 0.17 0.039
5 to 7 0.153 0.161 0.032
7 to 8 0.0745 0.072 0.0085
8 to 9 0.1045 0.1008 0.0119
 
Fig. 4  Dynamic parameters measured at substation 8 subject to three-phase fault at bus 8
(a) Line currents from substation 8 to bus 7,
(b) Load angle variation measured at substation 8,
(c) Voltages measured at substation 8,
(d) Active power supply from generators 1, 2 and 3
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5.2 Impact analyses of random switching attacks
A power system network can be operated remotely by system
operators through communication channels. An attacker can gain
access to the computer of a substation's relays or invade the
communication channels to inject direct ON/OFF commands to a
protection relay. The switching frequency of the CBs are chosen by
considering the processing time delay of the relay and relay
response time depending upon the current magnitude and curve
selection [20]. The protection system of a traditional synchronous
generator blocks the reclosing process for 15 cycles to ensure a
proper synchronisation of the machine [3]. The attacker can
manipulate this process and initiate random switching attack via
compromising the communication channels.
In this section, a random switching attack is generated at the
remotely located substation 8 and the variations of dynamic
parameters are investigated. The attackers take control over the
protective relay R 8-7 mounted on the substation 8 and send false
switching ON/OFF commands to the CB BR 8-7 from 10 to 12 s
within 10 cycle intervals. As a result of the continuous ON/OFF
switching of BR 8-7, the line currents of the 8-7 transmission line
severely fluctuate between 0 and 1000 A during OFF and ON
period of the BR 8-7, respectively. The sudden in rush current
measured by the relay R 8-7 is almost double than the operating
current 460 A. The line currents during the switching attack are
illustrated in Fig. 5a. As shown in Figs. 5b and c, load angles of the
generators and three-phase voltages also fluctuate heavily due to
the frequent ON/OFF switching of the BR 8-7 causing severe
hunting effects to the generators and motors. Fig. 5d shows the
output powers of the generators. During the OFF mode of the BR
8-7, the 300 MW load connected to the bus 8 is solely fed by the
generator 3. As a result, generated power of the generator 2
decreases and the generated power of the generator 3 increases to
meet the load's demand and vice versa.
In random switching attack, as explained, the CBs are falsely
opened and closed for several times by the attacker. During this
case, the relays would not be solely able to stop their opening/
closing actions. However, if the relays are equipped with a real-
time observer and able to observe the non-fault condition of the
line current, voltage and/or frequency, they would be able to
distinguish the attack and report it to the control centre to avoid
further damages or blackouts.
5.3 Impact analyses of integrity attacks
A proper relay threshold setting is required to successfully detect
fault situations in the system and generate trip command to the CB.
Manipulating the threshold setting is an integrity attack. As the
threshold is too high, overcurrent due to overload and short circuit
faults may not be recognised by the relay and the CB may fail to
trip during such abnormal situations.
Integrity attack is demonstrated in this section for the IEEE
benchmark WSCC 3-machine 9-bus system described in Section 4.
The nominal current flow through the line 8-7 is 460 A and the
relay tripping threshold for short circuit current is set at 1200 A. In
general, the physical security of remotely located substations are
more vulnerable than the generating substations. Therefore, it is
assumed that an attacker has compromised the setting of the relay
R 8-7 at substation-8 via changing the current threshold from 1200
to 5000 A. A three-phase fault is applied to bus 8 at time 10 s and
the protective relay R 8-7 fails to recognise the high level of inrush
current of the fault because of the manipulated relay setting
(Fig. 6a). As a result, the CB BR 8-7 continues to operate on ON
mode and does not trip. Consequently, the fault remains in the
system and the angles of the generators oscillate heavily (Fig. 6b)
which can cause severe system instability. The generators’ output
powers also increase and cause severe overload to the generators as
shown in Fig. 6d. The voltages at bus 8 remain zero due to the
continuation of the fault (Fig. 6c) in the line 8-7.
5.4 Impact analyses of DoS attacks
A DoS attack is basically launched by delaying or blocking the
switching command from a relay to a CB. During the DoS attack,
the execution process of a relay's command in protection algorithm
may be blocked, delayed or rejected. A successful DoS attack can
cause devastating consequences to the system's performance and
dynamic behaviours.
In order to illustrate a DoS attack scenario, a three-phase to
ground fault is applied to the line 8-7 near to the bus 8 at 10 s.
Although the overcurrent protection relay R 8-7 detects the
overcurrent immediately, due to the DoS attack, the execution
command has been delayed by 0.4 s and the CB BR 8-7 trips after
0.6 s. Such a delay violates the power system's standard and causes
severe disruption on its dynamic behaviour. Basically, a 0.2 s delay
is considered as the computational and communication delay to
Fig. 5  Dynamic parameters measured at substation 8 subject to the random switching attack at protection relay R 8-7
(a) Line currents from substation 8 to bus 7,
(b) Load angle during random switching attack at relay R 8-7,
(c) Voltages measured at substation 8,
(d) Active power supply from generators 1, 2 and 3
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execute the tripping command in power systems. As the fault
remains more than the standard execution time (0.2 s), the system
becomes more unstable than the normal clearing time [21]. The
inrush current flowing through the transmission line 8-7 is shown
in Fig. 7a. Comparing the dynamic behaviours of the system
during DoS attack and the three-phase to ground faults in Fig. 4,
the oscillations of generators’ load angles (Fig. 7b) and output
powers (Fig. 7d) are higher in DoS attack than the three-phase fault
which is cleared within 0.2 s. Moreover, as Fig. 7c shows, the line
voltages remain zero for a longer time until the tripping command
is executed by the CB (Fig. 7c), which may cause severe damage to
several electrical devices.
The same solution suggested for a random switching attack in
Section 5.2 would be applied to distinguish data integrity attack or
DoS attack scenario from normal fault condition. During these two
attacks, the operational modes of the relays are manipulated by the
attacker and thus cannot protect the system due to receiving a non-
suitable setting, a blocking mode or a delay mode created by the
attacker. Again, if the relays can recognise the falsified fault
situations via observing the real-time dynamic of the network
parameters, the attack can be understood by the control centres
before causing damages or blackouts.
Fig. 6  Dynamic parameters measured at substation 8 subject to the integrity attack at substation protection relay R 8-7
(a) Line currents from substation 8 to bus 7,
(b) Load angle variation during integrity attack at relay R 8-7,
(c) Voltages measured at substation 8,
(d) Active power supply from generators 1, 2 and 3
 
Fig. 7  Dynamic parameters measured at substation 8 subject to the DoS attack at protection relay R 8-7
(a) Line currents from substation 8 to bus 7,
(b) Load angle variation during DoS attack at relay R 8-7,
(c) Voltages measured at substation 8,
(d) Active power supply from generators 1, 2 and 3
 
IET Cyber-Phys. Syst., Theory Appl., 2020, Vol. 5 Iss. 4, pp. 321-329
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
327
5.5 Impact analyses of replay attacks
Replay attack in the power system protection system can be
launched to deceive the protection measurement data processing
and initiate an unnecessary and unscheduled tripping of the CB.
In this case, a three-phase fault is applied to the bus 8 at time
10 s and the fault is cleared at 10.2 s. It is assumed that the attacker
is able to compromise the data acquisition module by gaining
access to the communication channel. The attacker has stored the
fault data from the data-acquisition module and replays this
information to the relay at 30 s as can be seen in Fig. 8a which
mimics the fault situation occurred at time 10 s. As a result, while
there is no actual fault in the system, the relay opens the CB BR
8-7, and at 30.2 s, the line 8-7 is disconnected from bus 8 as
depicted in Fig. 8b. The voltages, generator load angles and active
powers delivered by the generators experience sudden topology
changes. The replay attack may not be severe to a small single unit
attack but could result catastrophic effect during coordinated
attacks. The total harmonic distortion (THD) of the line current is
very high (750%) during the fault but very low during the attack
(1–2%) (Figs. 8c and d). The reason is that during the attack, there
is no fault in the line and the current does not experience high
THD. Similar results are also obtained for the bus voltage shown in
Figs. 8e and f.
During a reply attack, while there is no real fault in the system
and subsequently no disturbances on the currents, voltages, load
angels of generators and delivered powers, a falsified fault scenario
is sent to the relays by an attacker. If the protection system/scheme
(i.e. relay) is able to observe the real-time dynamic parameters
such as line currents, voltages and so on, they would be able to
distinguish the fault condition from the attack scenarios, so that the
unnecessary opening/closing CBs will be avoided.
Particularly for the replay attack where the attacker stores the
data of a previous real fault condition and replays it back to the
relay after passing a specific time interval, a THD-based alternative
is recommended to be used. As can be seen in Figs. 8c and d, the
THD of the line current is significantly different from the THD of
the current during an attack. This could be a good indicator to
distinguish the faults from attacks. As a future work of this
research, a new real-time observer is aimed to be added to the
relay. Accordingly, the relay will be able to measure the real-time
THD of the line current and/or voltage and analyse the situation.
Following that, if a falsified fault command is received from the
attacker, while the line current and/or voltage exhibit normal THD
condition, the attack can be identified quickly, best actions can be
adopted and the reports are sent to the control centre, thus potential
damages/blackouts can be avoided.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel approach of analysing the dynamic
behaviour of a power system during four types of cyber attacks, i.e.
random switching attack, integrity attack, DoS attack and replay
attack. The system's dynamic performance during normal fault is
also shown and the related dynamic-based recommendations are
proposed accordingly. The dynamic analysis has the advantages of
considering the variation of more system parameters such as line
current, voltage, load angle of generators, delivered power and
frequency which are always assumed to be constant in steady-state
analysis. Moreover, the dynamic analysis can cover more system's
Fig. 8  Dynamic parameters measured at substation 8 subject to the replay attack at protection relay R 8-7
(a) Attacker current signal to the relay R 8-7,
(b) Actual line currents flowing from bus 8 to bus 7,
(c) THD of the line current during fault at bus 8,
(d) THD of the line current during replay attack to the relay R 8-7, (e) THD of the bus voltage during fault at bus 8, (f) THD of the bus voltage during replay attack at the relay R 8-7
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perturbations as well as post-disturbance behaviours. As the
dynamic performance of power grids during cyber attacks is quite
distinctive than that of during physical short circuit faults, therefore
detection and protection measures based on system dynamic
behaviour are highly recommended alongside the conventional
steady-state analysis and IT-based security.
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